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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT. 
This is an appeal of a civil matter, brought by the Plaintiffs - Appellants, Mark 
Hopkins and Kathy Hopkins d.b.a. Elk Ridge Financial. This is an appeal of the award of 
attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code section 78-27-56. The underlying claims of the 
Hopkins are waived having failed to obtain judicial enforcement of their contracted 
Agreements with Bill Hales, the Defendant - Appellee. 
STATEMENT RELATED TO OTHER APPEALS. 
There are no prior or related appeals concerning this matter. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION. 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (j) (1953, 
as amended) ((j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES. 
1) Whether the trial court concluded erroneously awarding attorney's fees 
pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-27-56, where there was no evidence of bad faith 
litigation, and the court's findings of bad faith go to the original formation of the contract 
alone? 
Issue preserved: 100, 157, 162, 281, 289, 326, 358, 380, 417. 
2) Whether the trial court misapplied Utah Code Section 78-27-56, where 
there existed a contract and so Section 78-27-56.5 should have applied? 
Issue preserved: 100, 157, 162, 281, 289, 326, 358, 380, 417. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW-
We review a trial court' findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard. Taylor 
v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 
(Utah 1994). "Tor a reviewing court to find clear error, it must decide that the factual 
findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record, resolving all 
disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination.' Id. at 
935-36. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law which we review for 
correctness." Taylor {citing Gull Labs., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 936 P.2d 1082, 
1084 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)). 
The standard of review regarding questions of law, this Court accords no deference 
to the trial court and reviews the trial court's decisions for correctness. J.H. v. West 
Valley City, 840 P.2d 115 (Utah 1992). 
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STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.* 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (2005) Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (2005) 
(* This provision is reproduced in the attached Addendum G). 
STATEMENTS OF THE CASE. 
I. Nature of the Case: 
This is an appeal of a civil matter from Sixth District Court in Sanpete County, 
Manti Division. The matter was brought by the Plaintiffs - Appellants, Kathy Hopkins 
and Mark Hopkins (together, the "Hopkins") seeking the enforcement of a binding Non-
Competition Agreement (hereinafter, the "Agreement). They entered into the Agreement 
with Mr. Hales, the Defendant - Appellee. 
After Mr. Hales employment terminated, the Hopkins sought enforcement of their 
agreements. In district court, the court dissolved the agreements concluding "bad faith" 
on the part of the Hopkins because of errors found against the Hopkins during Hales5 
employment. Afterwards, Hales sought attorney fees by filing a motion some ten months 
later. Only on appeal, is the question of that award of attorneys fees issued by the Court. 
However, it should be noted there is no evidence of bad faith litigation, and the Hopkins 
deny any "bad faith" intentions - the errors found by the trial court speak for themselves 
3 
and are only evidence of mistakes by Elkridge; not bad faith. 
II. Course of the Proceedings: 
The Hopkins commenced their injunction on December 28, 1999. R. 1, 358. Mr. 
Hales counsel, Mr. Graham, entered an appearance on January 7, 2000 and filed an 
answer on February 17, 2000. R. 19, 29, 358. A scheduling conference was conducted 
on April 12, 2000. R. 65, 67, 358. Mr. Graham appeared by telephone. R. 67, 358. At 
that hearing, the court scheduled the Hopkins' temporary restraining order hearing for 
May 3, 2000. R. 68, 359. 
At the May 3, 2000 hearing, the hearing lasted the duration of the one day and then 
the court recessed scheduling a second day for hearing on May 17, 2000. R. 86, 359. 
During the hearing, Plaintiffs exhibits 1 and 2, the non-competition agreement and the 
non-disclosure agreements were received. (See Addenda B and C). The parties then 
stipulated to reconvene till May 24, 2000 at 10:00 a.m. R. 93. 
On May 24, 2000, Mr. Graham appeared by telephone again. R. 93, 359. The 
Court scheduled oral arguments for June 21, 2000 at 2:00 p.m. R. 95, 359. On June 21, 
2000, the court heard oral arguments. R. 98, 359. The hearing commenced at 2:06 p.m. 
and the matter was taken under advisement at 5:07 p.m. R. 98, 359. At the closing of 
the hearing, the court ordered each party to prepare and submit proposed findings. R. 99, 
359. The proposed findings were submitted on July 3,2000. R. 100,106, 359. Relying 
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on the proposed findings, on July 27, 2000, the court entered its order. R. 132, 134, 359. 
(See findings and order, Addenda D and E). 
Since defeating the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, the 
Hopkins contended that Hales failed to prevail on any following issues. R. 359. After 
considerable debating over the July 2000 order, findings and decree, a new order was 
entered on December 19, 2002. R. 256, 359. (See Addendum F). Then finally, Hales 
moved for attorney's fees 10 months after the order was entered. R. 270, 359. 
III. Disposition in Trial Court: 
On December 19, 2002, the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. R. 256. Ten months later, Mr. Hales motioned for attorneys fees on October 1, 
2003. R. 270. The Hopkins opposed the motion, raising issues including timeliness 
arguments. R. 281, 289, 358. On March 15, 2004, the court ruled on the motion ruling 
that "The Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law in this case provide a sufficient basis 
for an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 78-24-56, Utah Code."1 But the court 
required a new motion to be filed because of deficiencies. R. 326. Ultimately, on July 
26, 2006, the Honorable David L. Mower entered judgment for attorney's awarding the 
Defendant Hales the amount of $6,085.00 erroneously. R. 462. See Order, (Addendum 
A). 
1
 The Hopkins assume "78-24-56" is merely a clerical error. The Hopkins believe the trial 
court meant to cite "78-27-56" as the true section to the Utah Code, 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The Hopkins are individuals residing in Gunnison City, Sanpete County, Utah. R. 
256. The Hopkins were the sole proprietors of Elkridge Financial. R. 257. They 
maintained their principal place of business in Gunnison. R. 257. Hopkins began doing 
business as Elkridge on or about February, 1997. R. 257. Bill Hales became acquainted 
on or about March, 199, when Hales sought to obtain a loan through the services of 
Eldridge. R. 257. 
Shortly after, on or about March, 1999, Hales and Hopkins entered into a business 
relationship whereby Hales was employed by Elkridge as an independent contractor and 
consultant. R. 257. Prior to this employment relationship, Hales had no experience in the 
loan or mortgage broker industry. The Hopkins offered Hales wages of $2,000.00 per 
month. R. 257. On May 13, 1999, after training, the Hopkins and Hales, executed two 
agreements, a Non-Compete Agreement, Exhibit 1, and a Non-Disclosure Agreement, 
Exhibit 2. See R. 469. The agreements restrained the defendant for five years and 100 
miles. R. 258. Hales received training, which included filling out loan applications and 
learning the documents of the mortgage trade. R. 257-58. 
Mr. Hales was set-up in a new office located in Richfield. R. 259. But because of 
financial troubles in September 1999, Hales was asked to look for other employment. 
Prior to lending, Mr. Hales acted a police officer. R, 258. He commenced looking for 
employment in law enforcement without success. R. 259-60. Therefore, he started 
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looking for employment with other mortgage brokers. R. 260. Meanwhile, Hales 
continued his work for Hopkins and Elkridge, soliciting loans and acquiring information 
and applications for potential loan applicants. R. 260. In November 1999, Mr. Hales was 
asked to relinquish his keys to the Richfield office and the files which he was working for 
Elkridge. R. 260. Hales promptly did so. R. 260. Pursuant to his earlier employment 
search efforts, Hales immediately contacted another mortgage broker to pursue 
employment. Such pursuit was finally fruitful and Hales begun to solicit loans for the 
new mortgage broker company towards the end of December, 1999, about three weeks 
after his termination. R. 260. Having learned of Hales activities in December, 1999, 
thus this action was commenced by the Hopkins. R. 1. Hopkins' filing of an action was 
reasonable under the law, in light of Exhibits 1 and 2, the non-disclosure and non-
compete agreements. R. 12, 469-a and 469-b. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT. 
Because this matter was a contract case, the application of Utah Code section 78-
27-56.5 was controlling. Since the contract did not have liquidated damages clause, no 
attorney's fees could be awarded to Hales. The trial court committed plain error awarding 
attorney's fees to Hales pursuant to Utah Code section 78-27-56. Moreover the trial 
court's belief that finding "bad faith" formation of the contract rather than finding "bad 
faith" litigation in order to award attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code section 78-27-
7 
56.5, was also clearly erroneous. 
ARGUMENTS. 
POINT ONE. 
THE PARTIES1 WRITTEN AGREEMENTS, TO WIT, THE NON-COMPETE 
AGREEMENT AND NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT, NEITHER PROVIDED 
FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
As a preliminary matter, we note that had the trial court reached a final judgment 
granting or denying a permanent injunction, we would dismiss that portion of the appeal 
challenging the temporary restraining order under the doctrine of merger. Sterling v. 
Constant™, 287 U.S. 378, 386, 77 L. Ed. 375, 53 S. Ct. 190 (1932); Champlin Refining 
Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 224, 76 L. Ed. 1062, 52 S. Ct. 559 (1932); 
Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel Co., 270 U.S. 587, 588-89, 70 L. Ed. 747, 46 S. Ct. 408 (1925); 
Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 44, 64 L. Ed. 445, 40 S. Ct 221 (1920); Atomic Oil, 419 
F.2datll02n.9. 
Utah Code section 78-27-56.5 provides for attorney's fees and states reciprocal 
rights to recover attorney's fees: 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in a civil 
action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed 
after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, 
or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (Supp. 2003). 
Utah Code section 78-27-56 otherwise provides for attorney's fees in litigation, 
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awarding where an action or defense was brought or asserted in bad faith. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection 
(2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party 
under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before 
the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the 
provisions of Subsection (1). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 2003). Here in this matter, the Hopkins did not file a 
frivolous action, nor were their claims raised in bad faith. In good faith, they filed their 
action relying on what they determined were enforceable agreements. Having no 
experience in the mortgage business Bill Hayes himself, Elkridge had a right to protect 
itself from having its trade secrets or copyrighted materials being used against it 
following Mr. Hales' termination, as the Hopkins apparently believed. By Hales' own 
signatures on the agreements, Exhibits 1 and 2, the Hopkins had every right to expect 
their agreements were enforceable, in good faith. In neither agreement was attorney's 
fees included as a provision. Regardless, the trial court in this matter did not award 
attorney's fees pursuant to either agreement or pursuant to Section 78-27-56.5. Instead, 
the awarded attorney's fees was provided citing to Section 78-27-56.2 
The history of Section 78-27-56, insofar as it can be reconstructed, suggests that it 
2
 Even though, the trial court erroneously awarded they citing to the wrong provision, 78-24-
56, in reality. 
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was designed as a cost statute. Utah, like most jurisdictions, adheres to the American 
Rule for awarding attorneys fees, viz., in the absence of a contractual or statutory 
provision which dictates otherwise, each party to litigation pays his own attorneys fees. 
This rule was derived, in part, from the belief that fees were costs, and that costs were a 
creature of statutes which could not be enlarged by judicial fiat. See, e.g., Western 
Casualty and Surety Company v. Mar chant, 615 P.2d 423, 426-427 (Utah 1980); Ranch 
Homes, Inc. v. Greater Park City Corporation, 592 P.2d 620, 625-626 (Utah 1979); 
Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601, 603-605 (Utah 1978); Leger Construction, Inc. v. 
Roberts, Inc., 550 P.2d 212, 215-216 (Utah 1976); American States Ins. Co. v. Walker, 
486 P.2d 1042, 1044 (Utah 1971). Cf. Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773-774 (Utah 
1980). In Utah, the rule has exceptions, for example, where "litigation . . . was not 
resorted to in good faith, but was merely spiteful, contentious or obstructive." Western 
Casualty and Surety Company v. Mar chant, supra at 427. See also, Ranch Homes, Inc. v. 
Greater Park City Corporation, supra at 625-626; American States Ins. Co. v. Walker, 
supra at 1044. Critics, however, view the rule as obsolete, and the exception for bad faith 
litigation as overstrict. They have argued for reform, either through abolition of the rule, 
or enlarging the exception for vexatious lawsuits. See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra at 
1082-1088; Ehrenzweig, "Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society," 54 
Calif. L. Rev. 792 (1966); Kuenzel, "The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation!" 
49 Iowa L. Rev. 75 (1963); Mayer and Stix, "The Prevailing Party Should Recover 
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Counsel Fees" 8 Akron L. Rev. 426 (1975); McLaughlin, "The Recovery of Attorneys' 
Fees: A New Method of Financing Legal Services" 40 Fordham L. Rev. 761 (1972); 
Stoebuck, "Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development" 38 U. Colo. L. 
Rev. 202 (1966); Note, "Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the 
Judicial Process," 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 619 (1977); Note, "Court Awarded Attorney's Fees 
and Equal Access to the Courts" 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 636 (1974); Note, "Use of Taxable 
Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigants" 53 Colum. L. Rev. 78 (1953); Note, 
"Deterring Unjustifiable Litigation by Imposing Substantial Costs" 44 111. L. Rev. 507 
(1949). 
Section 78-27-56 was introduced as H.B. 100 in the 1981 General Session of the 
Utah legislature. As proposed, H.B. 100 abolished the American Rule and permitted 
courts to award fees to prevailing parties in civil suits. It was amended, however, by the 
House Judiciary Committee to allow fees only "if the court determines that the action or 
defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith," and 
was enacted in this form. Given these circumstances, Section 78-27-56 may have been 
intended to broaden slightly or merely to codify the exception for bad faith litigation as it 
had existed in Utah. The paucity of procedural guidance under Section 78-27-56 is 
probably due to an assumption by the legislature that the rules for taxing costs, 
post-judgment, would be used in enforcing the statute. 
Despite the plain language of Section 78-27-56 and the intentions of the statute, 
l i 
the trial court awarded attorney fees to Mr. Hales. The award is contrary to the statute 
and its intended purpose. Here, there is no evidence of bad faith litigation. Here, the 
court merely, and incorrectly so, made a finding that the agreements were entered into in 
bad faith. However, a review of the trial court's own findings reveals a different 
conclusion. The reasonable conclusion is that Elkridge had made mistakes, those 
mistakes are not evidence of bad faith. Broken promises are distinguishable from 
misrepresentations. And Mr. Hales, despite it all was an "at will employee." He had no 
experience in the mortgage business prior to meeting the Hopkins. He was hired in 
March and eight month later, in November, terminated. After termination, Hales sought 
other employment with a competitor mortgage broker, and Elkridge sought enforcement 
of what they believed were binding non-compete and non-disclosure agreements. Not a 
big deal. No fees or costs should have been awarded. In Utah, the American Rule of 
each side being reasonable for its own attorneys should have been followed and this is a 
classic example where fees should not have been awarded to the defendant. Quite simply, 
Section 78-27-56 is not helpful and cannot be used as an excuse to award Hales any fees 
either, there is just no evidence of bad faith. Once, the Hopkins lost the first round of 
litigation, the TRO hearing, the Hopkins have no longer sought enforcement of their 
agreements. As for Hales, he filed counterclaimed issues, they two were abandoned by 
Hales as well. So, Hales cannot even assert that the Hopkins' defenses to Hales's 
counterclaims were asserted in bad faith either. 
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POINT TWO. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION WAS NOT TIMELY, AND THEREFORE WAIVED. 
Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, inter alia: 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in 
a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the 
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an 
appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs 
in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final 
determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and 
agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the 
entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a 
copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in 
the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating 
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have 
been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the 
costs claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, 
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the judgment was 
rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or 
subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and 
filed on the date judgment is entered. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2). The language in this rule is mandatory where in it states "must 
within 5 days." The judgment, along with the findings and conclusion were signed by 
this Court almost one year ago. Far in excess of the mandatory five day period. Clearly 
the request violates Rule 54 and therefore, Defendant's motion is not timely made and 
should therefore be denied. Being interlocutory in nature, that decision is a final 
appealable order and any request for fees must follow within 5 days or must be 
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considered waived. 
POINT THREE. 
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST WAS NOT REASONABLY GROUNDED, 
This case was an action which dealt with signed agreements, contracts in another 
word. While the judgment was final and resolved all issues in the case, the hearing in this 
matter was actually a hearing on a temporary restraining order which took place in 2000. 
To spend anywhere between an alleged 114 to 150 hours in this type of action is clearly 
not reasonable. This is the type of case and action that generally would not have taken 
more than 5 to 10 hours, tops, to prepare and to prosecute or defend-for either side. The 
Hopkins recognize that the length of the trial was about one-and-a-half days - however 
the salient issues presented by Hales was rudimentary two-fold. First, accepting the 
Court's ruling, the Covenant Not To Compete was overbroad; and second, there was a 
lack of consideration at the time the covenant was entered. In a case of this nature the 
evidence could have been presented much more streamlined and direct and saved the time 
of the court along with the party litigants. Because one party or the other takes a long 
time to present their case does not mean that it is reasonable. In this case, including in 
court time, 5 to 10 hours is the only time-frame that could be considered "reasonable" 
preparation. The prep-time cannot reasonably exceed the length of the trial time. 
Therefore, a reasonable request could not arguably exceed 10 to 20 hours, or in other 
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words $3,000.00 total. Two of the hearings, Mr. Graham appeared telephonically for 
scheduling purposes requiring hardly any prep-time. The Court awarded Mr. Hales in 
excess of $6,000.00 though. 
POINT FOUR. 
HALES'S AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS INADEQUATE TO CORRECT EARLIER 
MISTAKES. 
Hales asked for the outrageous amount of $22,550.81 as attorney's fees in this 
matter, that request was wholly unreasonable. Hales claims 150.34 hours at $150.00 per 
hour. On its face this would require very detailed time keeping, the type most attorneys 
never see, and in which this counsel the undersigned, has not seen in 19 years of 
practicing law. Hales's counsel would have to keep time records to the level of Vi of a 
minute. This is apparent because his time computation goes to the 1/100th of an hour 
(0.34) which equates to 6/10th of a minute or about 36 second per 1/100th of an hour. 
Counsel then did not provide any support for his position except a very general statement. 
A statement which makes it impossible to respond to except in very general terms. 
Counsel's affidavit was very general and woefully lacking hampering Elkridge's ability to 
respond with specifics, and therefore it begged to be denied. HERE, it begs to be 
reversed. 
POINT FIVE. 
COUNSEL'S OWN AFFIDAVIT WAS CONTRADICTORY LEADING TO 
CONFUSION AND LACK OF NOTICE TO PROPERLY DEFEND. 
In paragraph 2 of the affidavit, Hales's counsel claimed that 150.34 hours as being 
reasonable. In paragraph 4, counsel alleges that 114.57 hours is reasonable. A difference 
of 35.77 hours. This on its face creates questions of veracity with regards to what is 
reasonable or to be relied upon. Elkridge does not believe that either figure is reasonable 
but on its face Hales contradicts himself and both cannot be reasonable. This does not 
suggest that the less figure is acceptable, because of the arguments made therein are 
contrary to the law and lack sensibility. E.g., Hales's counsel contacted the FBI and 
sought to tax Elkridge for that cost. That's ridiculous. At any rate, Defendant's request 
should be denied for lack of reliability. 
POINT SIX. ELKRIDGE HAS NOT ASSERTED ANY FRIVOLOUS 
ISSUES OR ISSUES WITHOUT MERITORIOUS BELIEF. 
The Hopkins's case was based upon the parties' agreements between the party, 
which Hales signed of his own free will in May. In December, a month after termination, 
the Hopkins sought enforcement of these agreements. Hales resisted the enforcement of 
the agreements. Going to court as the parties did is the American way. The trial court 
found that the agreements to be unenforceable. That outcome was not foreseeable for the 
Hopkins - once the court made its judgment, the Plaintiffs accepted the court's ruling and 
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discontinued litigation. The Supreme Court in Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 
1983), has laid out the criteria for the award of attorney fees. The Court indicated that 
attorney fees are not to be awarded to all prevailing parties but rather to only those who 
bring cases without merit and without good faith. In Cady, supra, there was a contract (a 
real estate purchase agreement) which was not contested. The issue in Cady was that 
there was some internal quotation marks (" ") which were missing-a very trivial issue. 
The Court found this issue to be frivolous or without merit. This is not at all similar to 
this case where the Hopkins were, in good faith, seeking the enforcement of the parties 
agreements and the court happened to rule that the agreements were unenforceable. 
Though the Hopkins did not prevail in the action they presented their claim based in law 
or fact in good faith. For this reason, Hales's motion for attorney's fees should have been 
denied. The second prong in Cady dealt with the question of good faith. "Good faith" is 
defined generally as "honesty of intention and the absence of malice." Flynn v. United 
States, 902 F.2d 1524 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 623 (5th ed. 
1979)). This court reverse the judgment of the district court finding there was nothing in 
the record to support a defendant's claim that the Hopkins litigated maliciously or in 
absence of good faith. And since the district court's ruling, the Hopkins have 
discontinued attempts to enforce the voided agreements. 
In the case at bar Hopkins in good faith brought their action to enforce the 
agreements, Exhibits 1 and 2, which was freely and voluntarily entered into between the 
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two parties. The three elements enumerated in Cady are lacking concerning attorneys 
fees. First and foremost, the issue was not asserted at the time of trial and was not 
proved. These are only assertions made by the defendant in this second request for 
attorneys fees. Defendant's second request does not provide even a sworn affidavit and 
no proof of this point was alleged at trial. This suit was a legitimate controversy between 
Plaintiffs and the defendant about the validity of signed agreements. The fact that one 
party over the other party prevails does not create a belief of bad faith in litigation. All 
the issues argued were substantial legal arguments for both side. Absent Mr. Graham's 
inability to keep addresses straight and his failure to date a certificate of mailing, this case 
has been very similar to any other controversy between any plaintiff and defendant. 
Judgment of the district court should be vacated. 
CONCLUSION. 
In this matter, it is clear and convincing in light of the plain language of both Utah 
Code section 78-27-56 and 78-27-56.5, that the trial court abused its discretion in 
awarding Hales attorney's fees. It is the American Rule for each side to bear their own 
fees and costs. In this matter, as in any matter, the only time a party can be awarded fees 
under Utah Code section 78-27-56, is when the court finds that a party has acted in bad 
faith in the litigation. The trial court made no such findings. Besides, the application of 
Utah Code section 78-27-56 was also incorrect. Utah Code section 78-27-56 is not 
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available where there is a contract dispute. When there is a disputed contract, as there 
was in this matter, Utah Code section 78-27-56.5 applies in stead. Because no attorney 
fees provision was included in either of the parties' agreements disputed, no attorney's 
fees could be awarded pursuant to section 78-27-56.5. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i a ^ day of 
June, 2007. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Plaintiffs - Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. 
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on t h i ^ 7 _ day of June, 2007,1 mailed 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS, postage 
prepaid, to: 
Stanford A. Graham #6392 
STANFORD A. GRAHAM, P.C. 
4548 South Atherton Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Attorney for Bill Hales 
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ADDENDUM A 
Stanford A. Graham (6392) 
STANFORD A. GRAHAM, P.C. 
2120 North Valley View Drive 
Layton, Utah 84040 
Telephone: (801) 497-0094 
Facsimile: (801) 497-0982 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT - MANTI COURT 
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARK HOPKINS and KATHY HOPKINS 
dba ELK RIDGE FINANCIAL 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BILL HALES, 
Defendant. 
ORDER FOR JUDGEMENT 
Civil No. 990600458 
Judge Mower 
Based on the Court's Notice filed on June 1, 2006, the Court orders the following: 
An Order for Judgement for attorney's fees in the amount of $6,085.00 shall be awarded 
to Defendant. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE DAVID L. MOWER 
Sixth Judicial District Court Judge 
is - ' " 
c * 3 — •*• •• 
-
j
.}fc-£ums\ 
DATED this 2 ^ day of July, 2006. 
ADDENDUM B 
NOta-COMFETE AGREEMENT 
PLAINTIFFS EXHIBIT 
EXWBITHO *F / 
CASENO WOioOO iff 
DATERECD <r ;,
 A 0 
FOR GOOD CONSIDERATION, th* undersigned jointly and severally 
covenant and agree not to compete with the business of Slkndge Financial 
(Company] and its Lawful successors and assigns. 
The term "non-compete'' as used herein shall mean that the Undersigned 
shall not directly or indiroctly engage in a business or other activity 
described as. Loan Brokerage Pf»rvi«-^  notwithstanding whether s&id 
participation be as an owner, officer, director, employee, aq&nz, 
consultant, partner or stockholder (excepting as d passiv* investment in a 
publicly owned company). 
This covenant shall extend only for a radius of 100 milsa from th* 
present location of the Company at 97Sourfo Main, Gunnison, Utah/ 84634 and 
shall remain in full force and effect for 3 years from date hereof. 
In the event of any broach, tha Company shall be entitled to full 
injunctive relief without need to p^st bond, which rights shall be 
i 
cumulative with and not necessarily successive or exclusive of any other 
legal rights. 
ThiJ agreement shall be oinding upon and mure to the benefit of the 
parties, their successors, assigns and personal representatives. 
Signed this day of 
Witnessed; 
Witnesi 
^-/re-97 
witness 
ADDENDUM C 
U U U U L . n - 9 r - i i i n i »- o ^ c / x - c o -
HCM-DISCL0STO2 AGRBIMSOT 
PLAINTIFFS EXHIBIT 
EXHI8ITN0. ^ £ 
WEVIOENCE & 3 °^ 
cum £0 
To induce Elkridge F^anoia- (Client) to retain Bin Halo* 
(Promisor) as an outside consultant and to furnish Promisor with certain 
information that la proprietary and confidential. Promisor hereby warranU, 
represents, covenants, and agree? as foilown: 
1. Engagement. Promisor, in tne course of engagement by Client, may or will 
have access to or learn certain information belonging to Client that is 
proprietary and confidential (Confidential Information), 
2. Definition of Confidential Information. Confidential Information as used 
throughout this Agreement means any secret or proprietary information 
relating directly to Client's business and that of Client's affiliated 
companies and subsidiaries, including, but not limited to, products, 
customer lists, pricing policies, employment records and policiQS, 
operational methods4 marketing plans and strategies, product development 
techniques or plans, business acquisition plans, new personnel acquisition 
plans, methods of manufacture, technical proce$$ea, designs and design 
projects, inventions and research programs, trade "know-how," trade secrets, 
specific software* algorithms, computer processing systems, object and 
source codes, user manuals, systems documentation, and other business 
affairs of Client and Client's affiliated companies and subsidiaries. 
3. Nondisclosure. Promisor agrees to keep strictly confidential all 
Confidential Information and will not, without Client's e*prc$j written 
authorization, signed by one of Client's authorized officers, use, sell, 
market, or disclose any Confidential Information to any thx?d person, firw, 
corporation, Or association for any purpose. Promisor further agreos to not 
make any copies of the Confidential Information except upon Client's written 
authorization, signed by one of Client's authorized officers, and will not 
remove any copy or sample of Confidential information from the promises of 
Client without such authorization, 
4. Return of Material* upon receipt of written request from Client, Promisor 
will return to Client all copies or samples of Confidential Information 
that, at the time of the receipt of the notice, are in Promisor's 
possession. 
5. Obligations Continue Past Torm, The obligations imposed on Promisor shall 
continue with respect to each unit of the Confidential Information following 
the termination of the business relationship between Promisor and Client, 
and such obligations shall not terminate until such unit shall cease to bo 
secret and confidential and shall b« in the public domain, unless such event 
shall have occurred as a result of wrongful conduct by Promisor or 
Promisor's agsnta, servants, officers, or employees or a breach of the 
covenants set forth in this Agreement. 
5. Equitable RelieE. Promisor acknowledges and agrees that a breach of the 
provisions of Paragraph 3 or 4 of this Agreement would cause Client to 
suffer irreparable damage that could not be adequately remedied by an action 
at law. Accordingly, Promisor agrees that Client shall have the right to 
sesk Specific performance of the provisions of Paragraph 3 to enjoin a 
breach or attempted breach of fcho provlaions thereof, such right being in 
addition to ail other rignta and remedies that are available to client at 
law, in equity, or otherwise. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Agreement ha3 been signed tji-s day 
cf 
ADDENDUM D 
Stanford A. Graham (6392) 
STANFORD A. GRAHAM, PC. 
2120 North Valley View Drive 
Layton, Utah 84040 
Telephone: (801) 497-0094 I , 'J ; 
Facsimile- (801) 497-0982 
Attorney for Defendant " 
IN THE SDCTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY 
CITY OF EPHRATM, STATE OF UTAH 
MARK HOPKINS and KATHY HOPKINS ; 
dba ELK RTDGE FINANCIAL 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
BILL HALES ; 
Defendant. ] 
) FINDING OF FACTS 
) AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 990600458 
1 Judge: David L. Mower 
An evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order having been 
heard before the honorable David L. Mower on June 21, 2000, with Plaintiffs represented by their 
counsel, Douglas L. Neeley, and Defendant represented by his counsel, Stanford A. Graham, and 
based upon the pleadings herein and oral argument heard, the Court enters the following Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDING OF FACTS 
1. Mark Hopkins and Kathy Hopkins (hereinafter "Hopkins") are individuals 
residing in Gunnison City, Sanpete County, Utah. 
2. Hopkins are sole proprietors, of Elkridge Financial (hereinafter "Elkridge"). 
Elkridge is a registered d/b/a to Mark Hopkins and Kathy Hopkins. Elkridge and Hopkins provide 
mortgage broker services. 
3. The principal place of business of Elkridge is in Gunnison City, Sanpete County, 
Utah. 
4. Mark Hopkins is an equal partner with Kathy Hopkins in Elkridge, he has been 
employed full-time with Elkridge since January 1, 1998. 
5. Hopkins began doing business as Elkridge on or about February, 1997. 
6. Bill Hales (hereinafter "Hales") is a resident of Severe County, State of Utah. 
7. Hopkins and Hales became acquainted on or about March, 1999, when Hales 
sought to obtain a loan through the services of Elkridge. 
8. Shortly thereafter, on or about March, 1999, Hales and Hopkins entered into a 
business relationship whereby Hales was employed by Elkridge as an independent contractor and 
consultant. Prior to this employment relationship, Hales had no experience in the loan or mortgage 
broker industry, other than his experience in obtaining his own personal loans. At the initial 
employment of Hales, Hopkins agreed to pay Hales $2,000.00 per month. Hales was to be a traveling 
loan originator, soliciting loans for Elkridge. 
9. Elkridge did not provide a written employment agreement to Hales at the time of his 
initial employment. 
10. The training which Hales received from Elkridge included; learning how to fill out a 
loan application and learning the documents that loan applicants would need to provide to support 
their loan applications. All other information which Hales learned concerning the mortgage lending 
2 
business he learned on his own and through his own efforts. Elkridge provided no other instruction 
to Hales either directly through its own efforts or indirectly through instruction such as, seminars, 
professional training or otherwise. Hales received extensive sales training and experience prior to his 
employment with Elkridge through his involvement with Amway International. Such sales training 
and experience included; attendance at professional sales seminars, the purchase and study of volumes 
of sales and professional materials on how to start and progress a personal business and Internet 
businesses. Hales brought this education, training and experience with him to Elkridge. 
11. Prior to his business relationship with Hopkins, Hales had worked as a police 
officer and received compensation which included benefits such as health insurance, retirement and 
others. 
12. On or about May 13, 1999, nearly seven weeks after Hales5 initial employment, 
Hopkins presented a non-competition agreement and non-disclosure agreement to Hales. The 
limitations contained in the non-competition agreement consisted of a time restraint of five (5) years 
and a geographical restriction of a 100 miles radius from Elkridge's principal place of business in 
Gunnison, Utah, to Hales, an area of 31,400 square miles. The terms of the non-disclosure agreement 
are so broadly drafted that many do not apply to Elkridge's business. In addition, the Hopkins was 
not familiar with and did not understand many of the terms of the non-disclosure agreement. During 
closing arguments, the Hopkins offered to amend the non-compete agreement by reducing the 
geographical restrictions and time limitations contained therein. 
13. As an inducement to persuade Hales to sign the agreements, the Hopkins 
represented that they would promote Hales in the business, increase his compensation, and provide 
benefits to him, including health insurance. Moreover, Hopkins represented to Hales that he would 
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become an equity owner in the near future incorporation of Elkridge. The Hopkins did not intend 
to fulfill these promises. 
14. In reliance on these representations, Hales signed the non-compete and non-
disclosure agreements. 
15. During this same time in May, Mrs. Hopkins contacted Hales' sister, Tami Baugh. 
The two had recently become reacquainted through Hales recent association with Hopkins. During 
these communications, Mrs. Hopkins represented to Mrs. Baugh that Hopkins and Elkridge would 
obtain health insurance for Hales, that Hales future was bright with Elkridge, that soon Hales would 
be making commissions in addition to his base compensation of $2,000.00 a month and that Hales 
would have nothing to worry about financially. 
16. At the beginning of his employment, Hales performed routine office work including 
data entry, loan applications and answering phone calls. 
17. Earlier in the year, the Hopkins determined to open an office in Richfield, Utah. 
18. The Richfield office was opened on approximately April, 1999. At this time, Elkridge 
had been in business for over two (2) years and had established good business relations and good will 
with lenders, investors, appraisers, banks and other business entities in their area. Mark Hopkins 
initially manned the Richfield office until August, 1999. At this time Mr. Hopkins personally visited 
real estate agents and real estate brokers in the area, lenders, local banks, builders and title companies 
all in an effort to build and further strengthen existing business relations and good will between 
Elkridge and these entities. 
19. In or about July, 1999, the Hopkins informed Hales that he, alone, would be manning 
the Richfield office. Hales manned the Richfield office beginning in August, 1999. 
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20. Hales' responsibilities in Richfield included continuing his work as a loan 
originator, soliciting loans for Elkridge, answering the office telephone and soliciting loans via the 
telephone, meeting people in the Richfield office and opening and closing the office during normal 
business hours from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., five (5) days a week. 
21. Elkridge designated Hales as the "manager" of the Richfield office. Hales was 
the only individual in the Richfield office. He was responsible for managing his own time and conduct 
and not that of any other individual or entity. 
22. In September, 1999, approximately one (1) month after entering the Richfield 
office, Hales was informed by Mr. Hopkins that Hales would need to look for new work due to 
Elkridge's difficulty and inability to pay him and because of Mr. Hopkins' dissatisfaction with Hales' 
work. 
23. Hales immediately began a diligent search for new employment. In October and 
November, 1999, Mr. Hopkins reiterated his position that Hales seek and obtain new employment 
due to Elkridge's difficulty and inability to pay him and due to his continuing dissatisfaction with 
Hales' work. 
24. Hales' search for other employment included submission of applications to the 
local prison and local law enforcement agencies. Hales pursued these earnestly in an effort to obtain 
other employment. These searches, however, were fruitless. Hales also began searching for other 
employment with other mortgage brokers. 
25. Meanwhile, Hales continued his work for Hopkins and Elkridge, soliciting loans 
and acquiring information and applications for potential loan applicants. 
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26. During September, October and November, Hales informed Mrs. Hopkins of the 
representations made by Mr. Hopkins that Hales would need to find new work. On each such 
occasion, Mrs. Hopkins assured Hales that his business relationship with Elkridge was secure, that 
he did not have to worry. Not withstanding these representations from Mrs. Hopkins, Hales 
continued the search for other employment from September through November, 1999, that would 
allow him to adequately support his family. 
27. In or about June, 1999, Hales asked the Hopkins about the benefits they promised to 
provide him at the time he signed the non-disclosure and non-competition agreements. Hales was 
very anxious about securing health insurance for his family. Hales spoke with Mrs. Hopkins about 
this on numerous occasions over a number of months. On each of those occasions, Mrs. Hopkins 
would represent that the matter would be worked out, that Elkridge was looking into obtaining the 
insurance for Hales and that Elkridge would acquire the health insurance for Hales very soon. 
28. Although Mrs. Hopkins continually represented to Hales that she and Elkridge 
would obtain health insurance for Hales, the representations were never fulfilled. Neither health 
insurance nor any other benefits which the Hopkins promised Hales at the time of his signing the non-
competition and non-disclosure agreements were provided. 
29. Hales was not included as an equity owner in the incorporation of Elkridge, as 
promised. His compensation was not increased, as promised. 
30. In November, 1999, Hales informed Mrs. Hopkins that he would be taking a 
day oflf in December to pick up his mother from the Salt Lake City Airport upon her return from 
visiting her ailing father. Thereafter, Hales learned from his mother that she had arrived a few days 
early and that he would not need to pick her up. 
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31. Hales did not advise Mrs. Hopkins of this communication, he felt that as an 
independent contractor, he had no duty to do so. 
32. Hales took the requested day off to prepare for the Christmas season, 
purchasing gifts for his family, rather than retrieving his mother from the Salt Lake City Airport. 
33. On this same day, December 6, 1999, Mrs. Hopkins, through various phone 
calls, learned that Hales' mother was not out of town as Hales had represented to her approximately 
one (1) week before. 
34. Upon learning this information, Mrs. Hopkins contacted Hales to inquire about the 
seeming inconsistency of Hales5 earlier statements. 
35. Hales explained to Mrs. Hopkins what had happened concerning his representations 
to her, his mother's early arrival and his decision to take the day off to prepare for the Christmas 
holidays. 
36. Mrs. Hopkins accused Hales of lying to her and terminated the business relationship 
on the spot. 
37. Mrs. Hopkins expressed her unwillingness about having to pay Hales for the day that 
he had taken off from work at the rate of $100.00 per day. Hales told Mrs. Hopkins that she was not 
obligated to pay him and instructed her not to pay him for the day that he took off 
38. During this same conversation, Mrs. Hopkins instructed Hales to relinquish his 
keys to the Richfield office and the files which he was working for Elkridge. 
39. Hales promptly did so. 
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40. Pursuant to his earlier employment search efforts, Hales immediately contacted 
another mortgage broker to pursue employment opportunities. Such pursuit was fruitful and Hales 
began to solicit loans for the new mortgage brokerage company towards the end of December, 1999, 
about three (3) weeks after his termination. 
41. Hopkins learned of Hales activities in December, 1999, and filed a complaint 
against him for breach of the non-competition and non-disclosure agreements. Hopkins also 
contemporaneously filed a motion for temporary restraining order and injunction, seeking an order 
to prevent Hales from continuing to solicit loans within the 31,400 square mile area identified in the 
non-competition agreement, for a period of five (5) years. 
42. Hales ceased his business activity immediately until he recommenced on March 15, 
2000. 
43. From the time that Elkridge terminated its business relationship with Hales, to 
date, June 30, 2000, Hales has been involved in procuring five loans. None of the individuals for 
whom loans were acquired were customers of Elkridge. Nor were these loan applicants obtained by 
Hales through the use of the information he acquired from Elkridge. 
44. In 1998 and 1999, Elkridge obtained loan approvals at the rate of 25 to 40 per month. 
That rate has been maintained or has increased since the time Hales was terminated. Elkridge failed 
to identify any of its customer that ceased doing business with Elkridge to do business with Hales. 
Hales has encouraged at least one (1) Elkridge customer, a personal friend, to continue to do business 
with Elkridge and not with Hales. 
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45. Elkridge has succeeded in its business as a mortgage broker in rural Utah 
because of the Hopkins' willingness to maintain close and consistent communications with their 
customers, working closely with local appraisers and packaging loan information acquired from its 
customers for lenders and investors. Elkridge and Hopkins work hard to obtain the necessary 
information from its customers and to gain approval of their loan applications by determining what 
information lenders and investors need and how that information needs to be packaged. These efforts 
made by the Hopkins have created good will between Elkridge and its customers. 
46. Elkridge provides services as a mortgage broker in the areas of long term 
financing and debt consolidation. 
47. Compensation for Elkridge5 s services are easily calculated based on precise, fixed and 
easily determined broker origination fees and interest on principal loan amounts. 
48. Since it began business on approximately February, 1997, Elkridge has built its 
business through word of mouth, radio ads and other public promotions. Other mortgage companies 
in the area knew and were aware of these promotional efforts and methods. There are at least seven 
(7) other mortgage brokerage companies within a twenty (20) mile radius of Elkridge's principal 
place ob business. 
49. During Hales' business relation with Elkridge, Hales did not participate in same 
business promoting activities that Hopkins did. Rather, he simply solicited individuals to determine 
their needs for mortgage loan services. 
50. Hales was specifically instructed by the Hopkins not to contact lenders, investors, 
appraisers or any other service provider unless they instructed him to do so. Hales activities were 
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limited to acquiring loan application information and supporting documentation from customers, 
unless he was instructed to do otherwise by Mrs. Hopkins. 
51. Hopkins5 and Elkridge's clientele is focused in Sanpete and Sevier County and 
lies within a twenty mile radius of Elkridge's principal place of business in Gunnison, Utah. 
52. Hales did not develop any products for Elkridge. Hales' name, picture and position 
with Elkridge were not extensively promoted through advertising media. 
53. Hales was featured in a small number of Elkridge radio advertisements, but no more 
than five (5). 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. To be enforceable, a non-compete agreement must be supported by consideration. 
The non-compete agreement was provided to Hales after the time of his initial employment. 
Although he was promised additional benefits and compensation to entice him to sign the non-
compete and non-disclosure agreements, none of those benefits were increased compensation were 
ever provided. Therefore, the non-compete and non-disclosure agreements were not supported by 
consideration and are therefore unenforceable. 
2. In addition, the non-compete agreement is enforceable if there is no bad faith 
involved in the contract negotiations. The non-compete and non-disclosure agreements were not 
negotiable but were provided to Hales in a take it or leave it fashion. Moreover, Hopkins engaged 
in bad faith negotiations by promising consideration in exchange for Hales' signature and thereafter 
failing to provide that consideration. Therefore, the non-compete and non-disclosure agreements are 
unenforceable. 
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3. In ii In lii in nil linn' HI! i in i nil 11 Hie agreements are enforceable if they are necessary to 
protect the good will of the company. The non-compete agreement between Elkridge and Hales was 
not necessary to proh^i ^image's goo- . - Hopkins, not by 
Hales. Hales' brief work history with Flkridge to(-v !n \ith the lack of extensive advertising 
demonstrate that any good will enjo>ui ov LJM iugc i* a produci _ . , 
thiec \.\) yeari .iinl \";i'i ii1 "I "icaleil in any significant ua\ uv Hales. fherefore. tlv non-compete 
:<y ;vi:cnt is unenforceable. Elkridge did not provide any substantial training 10 \ ales during 
employment, tliei efoi e, thenon competition agreement wasnc protect any substauLiui 
investment made by Elkridge into the training of Hales. 
4. In addition, non-compete agreements -
restrictions • J " ;r*phical area. The geographical aiea of 3 *<' ^ jie miles is hot 
reasonable. 1 !;;s area is calculated based on the non compete agreement's i adius measurer- - • 
• H XI miles from hlkiidge' '> in IIK ipal oltin; i »f business Elkridge's business comes substantially from 
within a twenty (20) mile radius of its..principal,, place of business because the geographical restriction 
is not reasonable, the non-compete agreement is un . - . * , • • • 
i • ' ~ — n r c4 r:" - "cement is not reasonable, particularly when considered together with 
the unreasonaoie geogi . estriction. Therefore, the non-compete agreement is unciiloi ceable 
5. I - • * • • »• •- ,' •• r-s»- agreements are enforceable if the services rendered, by the 
employee were special, u?i;,^ > >r extraordinary. Hales' duties as an independent conti actor" did not 
constitute special, iiiiknic ur .,.!xl i jorcliiiai v S<T\ ires f lales' services were comprised of rather routine 
consisted of the exercise of a common calling -- that of a salesman, Therefore, the non-compete 
* moment is unenforceable. 
(jt Hales ha s a right to engage i n the common calling of a salesman The Hnu, leri^e 
training he acquired and which he used in selling mortgage loan services was knowledge and training 
lie i.iiLt||uiiei! pnui in In-> n mplnymcnt villi Mkridge I ho skills which he obtained and developed 
through his work with Elkridge belong 11 .*:. \ 
I he broad x- . . • • » ryi;*y. v .- nuii-compeleagiceinonl • n I 'MMled by 
any .restrictions related to the uniqueness of Hales' services or competitive unfairness. It does no 
more than restrain competition. 
I he noi 1 compete and non-disclosure agreements were entered 'into after the initial 
employment of Hales and were not ancillary to any written employment contract. 
nfiMvrililo i! IIDII « nmpoteapiconii.Mil finusf ho uippnrtod by nmoderation, 
cannot be the product of bad faith negotiations, must be necessan ' *ect the employer's good 
will, must be reasonable in its restrictions as to time and area, the employee's ser\ . . • oe special, 
u * - • extraordinary, cannot restrain the right to engage in a common calling and cannot baldly 
restrain competition. 
1 ' • : , . • • • • • • \'v'-u; --.Vr to issue, Hopkins must prove irreparable harm. 
Hopkins have failed to do so. Any damages which Hopkins sustained, if any, are easily calculable and 
are not subject to conj xtui s on speci llation Diiiiiiig.es, i fa iiy; a re compensable i nmc n ^ j 
11. Hales did not maintain a position with Eikridge for anv significant duration of time 
that would allow him to become a competitive threat to El kridge. In addition, the nature of his 
a threat to Eikridge, Hales' responsibi lilies did not put him in a position of familiarity with the public 
so a s to be a tlii eat to Eikridge. Hales' position did not allow him to obtain any technological or 
specialized expertise so as to be a threat to Eikridge. 
12. The threatened injury to Eikridge does not outweigh the damage Hales will sustain, 
ilir i Ipiiipoi'ii! v lesfiaijutijj, oi'iln ih iv«'inil If'in nnli'i ni r sin 11 Mules Mill hv IHIIIIIIMII in ;cek 
employment at least 100 miles from. Gunnison, Utah. This may require him to relocate Ms entire 
fai oily or to spend a total of four (4) hours commuting to and from work. Hales has sought alternate 
employment in the restricted area. However, such searches have proved fruitless. If the order does 
not issue, Eikridge will not sustain any significant damage. It has built a business reputation and 
clientele, good • • • . <. ^ - , •..
 ; 
injury to Haie^. \i the order issues, far nut weighs anv ..i|i:.\ which Eikridge may suffer. 
13. • The (Hide), ill issued pmsiMril to I;lkiulye\ kinesis, vn ijiilll In;" ddveiM'. Co I lie public 
interest. It is bad public policy to issue orders based on unenforceable contracts \ dditionally, it is 
bad public policy to issue orders based on contracts negotiated in bad faith. Because the non-
compete agreement is not enforceable and because it is a product of bad faith representations, 'the 
order cannot be issued. 
14. There is no substantial likelihood that Eikridge will prevail on the merits of its 
underlying claim The non-compete agreement is not enforceable. In addition, its language is over 
IIIIII.H) Moivovei, Ihe bn <nl .md n TI< iieaihiiig language nl llie iion-distlusure agreement is not 
supported by the mutual intent of the parties. Elkridr- •, 
contract. 1 fierefbre, a meeting of the minds is not possible.. The contract is unenforceable. 
A
-^ r e ' '•'* •• -. - s- . .j •., *m eieinems must je 
satisfied: 
.,_ ^i.iitges must be irreparable; • 
!
 < v damage to Elkridge if the order issues must 01 ltweigh the i njui > to Hales; 
^Uiiiu, ihe order must not be adverse to public interest; and' 
.. ..:ig 4i 
merits of its underlying claim. 
i^ATM) tins J /LdaiLof July, 'J000. 
BY THE COURT: 
)AVTD L. MOWER 
Sixth Judicial District Court .•• 
M A I M N C ; (i^u'ru.'irATE 
I hereby certify that on the f x _ day of 
postage prepaid, a true and exact copy 
CONCLUSIONS OF I A W to the following* 
of theAor 
_, 2000,1 mailed, via first class mail, 
b egoing FINDINGS «M7 i;.-\r: \ ,D 
Douglas L. Neeley, Esq. 
96 South Main Street, Suite 5-15 
Ephraim, Utah 84627 
Ml&w 
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ADDENDUM li 
Stanford A. Graham (6392) 
STANFORD A. GRAHAM, PC. 
2120 North Valley View Drive 
Layton, Utah 84040 
Telephone: (801) 497-0094 
Facsimile: (801) 497-0982 
" n /7 
A . . « t t v -.OMtfliTx 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY 
CITY OF EPHRATM, STATE OF UTAH 
MARK HOPKINS and KATHY HOPKINS 
dba ELK RIDGE FIN ANC1A L 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
1111 I. MAILS 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER AND 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
. . ; V90600458 
Judge: David L. Mower 
' J . - ' J C . ldusions ot j^aw, ourt orders me ioliowing: 
.v.. turn I<_I i cmporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction is 
denied. 
2. Plaintiffs non-disclosure agreement and non-compete agreement are not 
enforceable in law or equity. 
"" Defendant may lawfully engage in business in competition with Plaintiffs. 
4. ->! vi-'^'s shall pay .•„<•••- I. 
DATED t h j ^ e / I tftt^^J *U- , 2000. 
uv mi':11 nun 
ID L.MOWER 
O strict Court Judge 
MAILING CERT1FIC A1H 
I hereby certify that on the )fty*- day of ChiJLuf , 2000,1 mailed, first class, postage 
prepaid, a true and exact copy of the foregoing OROERD^NYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, to the foUowing: 
Douglas L. Neeley 
96 South Main Street, Suite 5-15 
Ephraim, Utah 84627 
O/XjlAJ (j^kjxm 
ADDENDUM F 
Stanford A. Graham (6392) 
STANFORD A. GRAHAM, P.C 
2120 North Valley View Drive 
Layton,Utah 84040 
Telephone: (801)497-0094 
Facsimile: (801)497-0982 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY 
CITY OF EPHRAIM, STATE OF UTAH 
MARK HOPKINS and KATHY HOPKINS ) 
dba ELK RIDGE FINANCIAL, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs.
 J 
BILL HALES, ; 
Defendant. ] 
1 FINDINGS OF FACT 
I AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 990600458 
An evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 
having been heard before the honorable David L. Mower on June 21, 2000, with 
Plaintiffs represented by their counsel, Douglas L. Neeley, and Defendant represented by 
his counsel, Stanford A. Graham, and based upon the pleadings herein and oral argument 
heard, the Court enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Mark Hopkins and Kathy Hopkins (hereinafter "Hopkins") are individuals 
residing in Gunnison City, Sanpete County, Utah. 
i 
2. Hopkins are sole proprietors, of Elkridge Financial (hereinafter 
"Elkridge"). Elkridge is a registered d/b/a to Mark Hopkins and Kathy Hopkins. 
Elkridge and Hopkins provide mortgage broker services. 
3. The principal place of business of Elkridge is in Gunnison City, Sanpete 
County, Utah 
4. Mark Hopkins is an equal partner with Kathy Hopkins in Elkridge, he has 
been employed full-time with Elkridge since January 1, 1998. 
5. Hopkins began doing business as Elkridge on or about February, 1997. 
6. Bill Hales (hereinafter "Hales") is a resident of Severe County, State of 
Utah. 
7. Hopkins and Hales became acquainted on or about March, 1999, when 
Hales sought to obtain a loan through the services of Elkridge. 
8. Shortly thereafter, on or about March, 1999, Hales and Hopkins entered 
into a business relationship whereby Hales was employed by Elkridge as an independent 
contractor and consultant. Prior to this employment relationship, Hales had no 
experience in the loan or mortgage broker industry, other than his experience in obtaining 
his own personal loans. At the initial employment of Hales, Hopkins agreed to pay Hales 
$2,000.00 per month. Hales was to be a traveling loan originator, soliciting loans for 
Elkridge. 
9. Elkridge did not provide a written employment agreement to Hales at the 
time of his initial employment. 
10. The training which Hales received from Elkridge included; learning how 
to fill out a loan application and learning the documents that loan applicants would need 
to provide to support their loan applications. All other information which Hales learned 
concerning the mortgage lending business he learned on his own and through his own 
efforts. Elkridge provided no other instruction to Hales either directly through its own 
efforts or indirectly through instruction such as, seminars, professional training or 
otherwise. Hales received extensive sales training and experience prior to his 
employment with Elkridge through his involvement with Amway International. Such 
sales training and experience included; attendance at professional sales seminars, the 
purchase and study of volumes of sales and professional materials on how to start and 
progress a personal business and Internet businesses. Hales brought this education, 
training and experience with him to Elkridge. 
11. Prior to his business relationship with Hopkins, Hales had worked as a 
police officer and received compensation which included benefits such as health 
insurance, retirement and others. 
12. On or about May 13, 1999, nearly seven weeks after Hales' initial 
employment, Hopkins presented a non-competition agreement and non-disclosure 
agreement to Hales. The limitations contained in the non-competition agreement 
consisted of a time restraint of five (5) years and a geographical restriction of a 100 miles 
radius from Elkridge's principal place of business in Gunnison, Utah, to Hales, and area 
of 31,400 square miles. The terms of the non-disclosure agreement are so broadly drafted 
that many do not apply to Elkridge's business. In addition, the Hopkins was not familiar 
with and did not understand many of the terms of the non-disclosure agreement. During 
closing arguments, the Hopkins offered to amend the non-compete agreement by 
reducing the geographical restrictions and time limitations contained therein. 
13. As an inducement to persuade Hales to sign the agreements, the Hopkins 
represented that they would promote Hales in the business, increase his compensation, 
and provide benefits to him, including health insurance. Moreover, Hopkins represented 
to Hales that he would become an equity owner in the near future incorporation of 
Elkridge. The Hopkins did not intend to fulfill these promises. 
14. In reliance on these representations, Hales signed the non-compete and 
non-disclosure agreements. 
15. During this time in May, Mrs. Hopkins contacted Hales' sister, Tami 
Baugh. The two had recently become reacquainted through Hales recent association with 
Hopkins. During these communications, Mrs. Hopkins represented to Mrs. Baugh that 
Hopkins and Elkridge would obtain health insurance for Hales, that Hales future was 
bright with Elkridge, that soon Hales would be making commission in addition to his 
base compensation of $2,000.00 a month and that Hales would have nothing to worry 
about financially. 
16. At the beginning of his employment, Hales performed routine office work 
including data entry, loan applications and answering phone calls. 
17. Earlier in the year, the Hopkins determined to open an office in Richfield, 
Utah. 
18. The Richfield office was opened on approximately April, 1999. At this 
time, Elkridge had been in business for over two (2) years and had established good 
business relations and good will with lenders, investors, appraisers, banks and other 
business entities in their area. Mark Hopkins initially manned the Richfield office until 
August, 1999. At this time Mr. Hopkins personally visited real estate agents and real 
estate brokers in the area, lenders, local banks, builders and title companies all in an 
effort to build and further strengthen existing business relations and good will between 
Elkridge and these entities. 
19. In or about July, 1999, the Hopkins informed Hales that he, alone, would 
be manning the Richfield office. Hales manned the Richfield office beginning in August, 
1999. 
20. Hales' responsibilities in Richfield included continuing his work as a loan 
originator, soliciting loans for Elkridge, answering the office telephone and soliciting 
loans via the telephone, meeting people in the Richfield office and opening and closing 
the office during normal business hours from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., five (5) days a week. 
21. Elkridge designated Hales as the "manager" of the Richfield office. Hales 
was the only individual in the Richfield office. He was responsible for managing his own 
time and conduct and not that of any other individual or entity. 
22. In September, 1999, approximately one (1) month after entering the 
Richfield office, Hales was informed by Mr. Hopkins that Hales would need to look for 
new work due to Elkridge's difficulty and inability to pay him and because of Mr. 
Hopkins' dissatisfaction with Hales' work. 
23. Hales immediately began a diligent search for new employment. In 
October and November, 1999, Mr. Hopkins reiterated his position that Hales seek and 
obtain new employment due to Elkridge's difficulty and inability to pay him and due to 
his continuing dissatisfaction with Hales' work. 
24. Hales' search for other employment included submission of applications 
to the local prison and local law enforcement agencies. Hales pursued these earnestly in 
an effort to obtain other employment. These searches, however, were fruitless. Hales 
also began searching for other employment with other mortgage brokers. 
25. Meanwhile, Hales continued his work for Hopkins and Elkridge, soliciting 
loans and acquiring information and applications for potential lion applicants. 
26. During September, October and November, Hales informed Mrs. Hopkins 
of the representations made by Mr. Hopkins that Hales would need to find new work. On 
each such occasion, Mrs. Hopkins assured Hales that his business relationship with 
Elkridge was secure, that he did not have to worry. Not withstanding these 
representations from Mrs. Hopkins, Hales continued the search for other employment 
from September through November, 1999, that would allow him to adequately support 
his family. 
27. In or about June, 1999, Hales asked the Hopkins about the benefits they 
promised to provide him at the time he signed the non-disclosure and non-competition 
agreements. Hales was very anxious about securing health insurance for his family. 
Hales spoke with Mrs. Hopkins about this on numerous occasions over a number of 
months. On each of those occasions, Mrs. Hopkins would represent that the matter 
would be worked out, that Elkridge was looking into obtaining the insurance for Hales 
and that Elkridge would acquire the health insurance for Hales very soon. 
28. Although Mrs. Hopkins continually represented to Hales that she and 
Elkridge would obtain health insurance for Hales, the representations were never 
fulfilled. Neither health insurance nor any other benefits which the Hopkins promised 
Hales at the time of his signing the non-competition and non-disclosure agreements were 
provided. 
29. Hales was not included as an equity owner in the incorporation of 
Elkridge, as promised. His compensation was not increased, as promised. 
30. In November, 1999, Hales informed Mrs. Hopkins that he would be taking 
a day off in December to pick up his mother from Salt Lake City Airport upon her return 
from visiting her ailing father. Thereafter, Hales learned from his mother that she had 
arrived a few days early and that he would need to pick her up. 
31. Hales did not advise Mrs. Hopkins of this communication, he felt that as 
an independent contractor, he had no duty to do so. 
32. Hales took the requested day off to prepare for the Christmas season, 
purchasing gifts for his family, rather than retrieving his mother from the Salt Lake City 
Airport. 
33. On this same day, December 6, 1999, Mrs. Hopkins, through various 
phone calls, learned that Hales' mother was not out of town as Hales had represented to 
her approximately one (1) week before. 
34. Upon learning this information, Mrs. Hopkins contacted Hales to inquire 
about the seeming inconsistency of Hales' earlier statements. 
35. Hales explained to Mrs. Hopkins what had happened concerning his 
representations to her, his mother's early arrival and his decision to take the day off to 
prepare for the Christmas holidays. 
36. Mrs. Hopkins accused Hales of lying to her and terminated the business 
relationship on the spot. 
37. Mrs. Hopkins expressed her unwillingness about having to pay Hales for 
the day that he had taken off from work at the rate of $100.00 per day. Hales told Mrs. 
Hopkins that she was not obligated to pay him and instructed her not to pay him for the 
day that he took off. 
38. During this same conversation, Mrs. Hopkins instructed Hales to 
relinquish his keys to the Richfield office and the files which he was working for 
Elkridge. 
39. Hales promptly did so. 
40. Pursuant to his earlier employment search efforts, Hales immediately 
contacted another mortgage broker to pursue employment opportunities. Such pursuit 
was fruitful and Hales began to solicit loans for the new mortgage brokerage company 
towards the end of December, 1999, about three (3) weeks after his termination. 
41. Hopkins learned of Hales activated in December, 1999, and filed a 
complaint against him for breach of the non-competition and non-disclosure agreements. 
Hopkins also contemporaneously filed a motion for temporary restraining order and 
injunction, seeking an order to prevent Hales from continuing to solicit loans with the 
31,400 square mile area identified in the non-competition agreement, for a period of five 
(5) years. 
42. Hales ceased his business activity immediately until he recommenced on 
March 15, 2000. 
43. From the time that Elkridge terminated its business relationship with 
Hales, to date, June 30, 2000, Hales has been involved in procuring five loans. None of 
the individuals from whom loans were acquired were customers of Elkridge. Nor were 
these loan applicants obtained by Hales through the use of the information he acquired 
from Elkridge. 
44. In 1998 and 1999, Elkridge obtained loan approvals at the rate of 25 to 40 
per month. That rate has been maintained or has increased since the time Hales was 
terminated. Elkridge failed to identify any of its customers that ceased doing business 
with Elkridge to do business with Hales. Hales has encouraged at least one (1) Elkridge 
customer, a personal friend, to continue to do business with Elkridge and not with Hales. 
45. Elkridge has succeeded in its business as a mortgage broker in rural Utah 
because of the Hopkins' willingness to maintain close and consistent communications 
with their customers, working closely with local appraisers and packaging loan 
information acquired from its customers for lenders and investors. Elkridge and Hopkins 
work hard to obtain the necessary information from its customers and to gain approval of 
their loan applications by determining what information lenders and investors need and 
how that information needs to be packaged. These efforts made by the Hopkins have 
created good will between Elkridge and its customers. 
46. Elkridge provides services as a mortgage broker in the areas of long term 
financing and debt consolidation. 
47. Compensation for Elkridge's services are easily calculated based on 
precise, fixed and easily determined broker origination fees and interest on principal loan 
amounts. 
48. Since it began business on approximately February, 1997, Elkridge has 
built its business through work of mouth, radio ads and other public promotions. Other 
mortgage companies in the area knew and were aware of these promotional efforts and 
methods. There are at least seven (7) other mortgage brokerage companies with a twenty 
(20) mile radius of Elkridge's principal place of business. 
49. During Hales' business relation with Elkridge, Hales did not participate in 
same business promoting activities that Hopkins did. Rather, he simply solicited 
individuals to determine their needs for mortgage loan services. 
50. Hales was specifically instructed by the Hopkins not to contact lenders, 
investors, appraisers or any other service provider unless they instructed him to do so. 
Hales activities were limited to acquiring loan application information and supporting 
documentation from customers, unless he was instructed to do otherwise by Mrs. 
Hopkins. 
51. Hopkins' and Elkridge's clientele is focused in Sanpete and Sevier County 
and lies within a twenty (20) mile radius of Elkridge*s principal place of business in 
Gunnison, Utah. 
52. Hales did not develop any products for Elkridge. Hales' name, picture and 
position with Elkridge were not extensively promoted through advertising media. 
53. Hales was featured in a small number of Elkridge radio advertisements, 
but no more that five (5). 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. To be enforceable, a non-compete agreement must be supported by 
consideration. The non-compete agreement was provided to Hales after the time of his 
initial employment. Although he was promised additional benefits and compensation to 
entice him to sign the non-compete and non-disclosure agreements, none of those 
benefits or increased compensation was ever provided. Therefore, the non-compete and 
non-disclosure agreements were not supported by consideration and are therefore 
unenforceable. 
2. In addition, the non-compete agreement is enforceable if there is no bad 
faith involved in the contract negotiations. The non-compete and non-disclosure 
agreements were not negotiable but were provided to Hales in a take it or leave it fashion. 
Moreover, Hopkins engaged in bad faith negotiations by promising consideration in 
exchange for Hales' signature and thereafter failing to provide that consideration. 
Therefore, the non-compete and non-disclosure agreements are unenforceable. 
3. In addition, the non-compete agreements are enforceable if they are 
necessary to protect the good will of the company. The non-compete agreement between 
Elkridge and Hales was not necessary to protect Elkridge's good will. Its good will was 
created by the Hopkins, not by Hales. Hales' brief work history with Elkridge, together 
with the lack of extensive advertising demonstrate that any good will enjoyed by Elkridge 
is a product of the Hopkins work over the last three (3) years and was not created in any 
significant way by Hales. Therefore, the non-compete agreement is unenforceable. 
Elkridge did not provide any substantial training to Hales during this employment; 
therefore, the non-competition agreement was not necessary to protect any substantial 
investment made by Elkridge into the training of Hales. 
4. In addition, non-compete agreements are enforceable if they are 
reasonable in their restrictions as to time and geographical area. The geographical area of 
31,400 square miles in not reasonable. This area is calculated based on the non-compete 
agreement's radius measurement of 100 miles from Elkridge's principal place of 
business. Elkridge's business comes substantially from within a twenty (20) mile radius 
of its principal place of business because the geographical restriction is not reasonable, 
the non-compete agreement is unenforceable. The time restraint of five (5) years 
included in the non-compete agreement is not reasonable, particularly when considered 
together with the unreasonable geographical restriction. Therefore, the non-compete 
agreement is unenforceable. 
5. In addition, non-compete agreements are enforceable if the services 
rendered by the employee were special, unique or extraordinary. Hales' duties as an 
independent contractor did not constitute special, unique or extraordinary services. 
Hales' services were comprised of rather routine office work and sales. Although Hales' 
services may have been valued highly by Elkridge, they consisted of the exercise of a 
common calling - that of a salesman. Therefore, the non-compete agreement is 
unenforceable. 
6. Hales has a right to engage in the common calling of a salesman. The 
knowledge and training he acquired and which he used in selling mortgage loan service 
was knowledge and training he acquired prior to his employment with Elkridge. The 
skills which he obtained and developed through his work with Elkridge belong to him. 
7. The broad and unrestrained language of the non-compete agreement is not 
limited by any restrictions related to the uniqueness of Hales' services or competitive 
unfairness. It does not more than restrain competition. 
8. The non-compete and non-disclosure agreements were entered into after 
the initial employment of Hales and were not ancillary to any written employment 
contract. 
9. To be enforceable, a non-compete agreement must be supported by 
consideration, cannot be the product of bad faith negotiations, must be necessary to 
protect the employer's good will, must be reasonable in its restrictions as to time and 
area, the employee's services must be special, unique or extraordinary, cannot restrain the 
right to engage in a common calling and cannot baldly restrain competition. 
10. For a temporary restraining order to issue, Hopkins must prove irreparable 
harm. Hopkins has failed to do so. Any damages which Hopkins sustained, if any, are 
easily calculable and are not subject to conjecture or speculation. Damages, if any, are 
compensable in money. 
11. Hales did not maintain a position with Elkridge for any significant 
duration of time that would allow him to become a competitive threat to Elkridge. In 
addition, the nature of his position did not allow him to acquire the relationships with 
business entities that would prove to be a threat to Elkridge. Hales5 responsibilities did 
not put him in a position of familiarity with the public so as to be a threat to Elkridge. 
Hales' position did not allow him to obtain any technological or specialized expertise so 
as to be a threat to Elkridge. 
12. The threatened injury to Elkridge does not outweigh the damage Hales 
will sustain if a temporary restraining order is issued. If an order is issued, Hales will be 
required to seek employment at least 100 miles from Gunnison, Utah. This may require 
him to relocate his entire family or to spend a total of four (4) hours commuting to and 
from work. Hales has sought alternate employment in the restricted area. However, such 
searches have proved fruitless. If the order does not issue, Elkridge will not sustain any 
significant damage. It has built a business reputation and clientele, good will and 
business contacts that cannot be endangered by Hales alone. Therefore, the injury to 
Hales, if the order issues, far outweighs any injury which Elkridge may suffer. 
13. The order, if issued pursuant to Elkridge's requests, would be adverse to 
the public interest. It is bad public policy to issue orders based on unenforceable 
contracts. Additionally, it is bad public policy to issue orders based on contracts 
negotiated in bad faith. Because the non-compete agreement is not enforceable and 
because it is a product of bad faith representations, the order cannot be issued. 
14. There is nojub^taiitml likelihood that Elkridge will prevail on the merits 
of its underlying claim. The non-compete agreement is not enforceable. In addition, its 
language is over broad. Moreover, the broad and over reaching language of the non-
disclosure agreement is not supported by the mutual intent of the parties. Elkridge is not 
aware of the meaning of its own contract. Therefore, a meeting of the minds is not 
possible. The contract is unenforceable. 
15. For a temporary restraining order to issue, the four following elements 
must be satisfied: 
(a) Elkridge damages must be irreparable; 
(b) The damage to Elkridge if the order issues must outweigh the 
injury to Hales: 
(c) Issuing the order must not be adverse to public interest; and 
(d) Elkridge must demonstrate a substantial likelihood of prevailing at 
trial on the merits of its underlying claim. 
16. The Court finds that none of these elements has been met. 
DATED this jj^_ day of December, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
1 )jiii^ 
JBDGfc DAVID L. V I  . MOWER 
Sixth Judicial District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of December, 2002,1 mailed, via first 
class mail, postage prepaid, a true and exact copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, to the following: 
David Bruce Oliver 
180 South 300 West #210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on the j£\_ day of December, 2002, a copy of documents 
entitled Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 
and Preliminary Injunction and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
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Stanford A. Graham 
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Layton, Utah 84040 
David Bruce Oliver 
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ADDENDUM G 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith — Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good 
faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party under Subsection 
(1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the provisions of Subsection 
Amended by Chapter 92, 1988 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 78 23046.ZIP 1,943 Bytes 
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78-27-56.5. Attorney's fees — Reciprocal rights to recover attorney's fees. 
A court may award costs and attorneys fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon 
any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the 
provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover 
attorney's fees. 
Enacted by Chapter 79, 1986 General Session 
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